In a version of history told by Hans Bethe, scientists in the nuclear age had a dual obligation to serve the state and to inform the public about government policy, especially when policy had become unwise or dangerous. Bethe himself seemed to model these principles. A leader on the Manhattan Project, he had supported the international control of atomic energy and a nuclear test ban in the postwar years. This paper revisits historical memory of the social responsibility of science, using Bethe’s Cold War engagement with the issue of ballistic missile defense as a study of the mismatch between memory and reality. In the late 1960s, Bethe solidified his reputation as an outspoken insider critic when he published a detailed critique (with fellow physicist Richard Garwin) of the proposed U.S. Anti-Ballistic Missile system. What historians have never discussed, however, is the fact that while Bethe counseled nuclear restraint on prominent advisory positions and in public, he quietly worked as a highly paid consultant to industrial contractors designing and developing the system (as well as on countermeasures to overcome missile defense). Bethe pursued incongruous private and public roles that seemed to present, for him, no apparent contradiction. The paper explores the relationship and tensions between Bethe’s classified work and the maintenance of his public image.
